Economic Growth in Japan Cultural (Neo-Confucianism) Aanalysis by Chan, Monica
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
OpenSIUC
Honors Theses University Honors Program
5-1991
Economic Growth in Japan Cultural (Neo-
Confucianism) Aanalysis
Monica Chan
Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/uhp_theses
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the University Honors Program at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chan, Monica, "Economic Growth in Japan Cultural (Neo-Confucianism) Aanalysis" (1991). Honors Theses. Paper 109.
I 
I UNIVERSITY HONOR THESIS 499 
I 
I ADVISOR: OR. YOONBAI KIM 
I DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
I SPRING 91 
I  
I  
I  
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN JAPAN
I CULTURAL ( NEO-CONFUCIANISM ) ANALYSIS 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I APresentation by--
MONICA CHANI 
I 
I 
I 
I  
I  
I OUTLINE 
I 1 INTRODUCTION 
2 CONFUCIAN LEARNING ENHANCES LABOR PRODUCTIVITY 
I (1) CONFUCIAN VIEW ON LEARNING 
I (2) JAPANESE EDUCATION SYSTEM PROVIDES LITERATE PUBLIC (3) ROTE LEARNING FOSTER TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY 
I (4) TRAININGS IN BUSINESS PROVIDE SKILLED LABOR FORCE 
(5) CONFUCIAN PERFECTIONISM ON CORPORATE PLANNING 
I 
I (6) STUDY OF JAPANESE EDUCATION ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
DURING 1953-1971 
I 
(7) PROBLEMS IN JAPANESE EDUCATION SYSTEM 
3 CONFUCIAN FAMILISM SMOOTH LABOR RELATIONSHIP 
1) CONFUCIAN VIEW ON FILIAL PIETY 
I 2) JAPANESE FAMILISM ON ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
3) FAMILISM IN LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP
I 
I 
4) EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR RELATIONSHIP 
5) RISE OF COMPANY-BASED UNIONS 
6) UNIQUE FEATURES OF JAPANESE PERSONNEL PRACTICES 
I 7) COOPERATION BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND LABOR 
4) CONCLUSION: CONFUCIAN INFLUENCES IN OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I  
I  
I I INTRODUCTION 
I The ~ise of the new economic powe~ of - Japan, 
in less than one and a half centu~ies, has caused wo~ld 
I 
I attention to this unique count~y which a~ms a motto of " 
Western technology and Japanese spirit." Weste~n nations 
label it as "Japan Inc.," "Confucian Capitalism," and so 
I fo~th. Many economists have t~aced the mi~acle economic 
g~owth of Japan f~om va~ious facto~s such as expo~t­
I o~ientation, high ~ate of capital formation, gove~nment 
I st~ategies development, Weste~n technology and financial 
aids, and even its t~aditional value. Confucianism, the most 
I indigenous ~eligious philosophy of the Chinese, is today 
being singled out as the main sou~ce of that t~adition. 
I Howeve~, the a~ea of cultu~al explanation is the most 
I controve~sial. Max Webe~ had condemned Confucianism as the 
value that would foste~ economic g~owth. In his theo~y, "The 
I (Confucian) gentlemen was "not a tool "; that is, in his 
adjustment to the world and his self-perfection. He was an 
I end unto himself, not a means for any functional end. This 
core of Confucian ethics rejected training in Economics
I for the pursuit of profit. •• " (Weber, 1951, p. 246) The first 
I Weste~n schola~ who suppo~ted cultu~al analysis of Japan's 
economic development was pe~haps Herman Kahn. He said in his 
I book, Wo~ld Economic Development, 1979 and Beyond, "under 
cLlrrent condi tions the neo-Confucian nil tures have many
I strengths and relatively few weaknesses. Japan, South Korea, 
I 
I  
I  
I  Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the ethnic Chinese  
minorities in Nalaysia and Thailand seem more adept at 
I industrialization than the West •.• The Confucian ethnic••• 
will result in all the neo-Confucian societies having at 
I least potentially higher growth rates than other societies" 
I (Kahn, 1979, pp. 118, 122). American Sociologist, Peter 
Berger believes that orthodo~ Confucianism might hinder 
I economic profit pursue, but Confucianism has been transformed 
into "vulgar Confucianism" in Japan and other Asian countries 
I that it can be fle~ible and adaptable to market mechanism. 
I The first of the Asian nations to emerge as a world 
economic power was Japan, which under the Meiji restoration 
I rapidly understood industrialization and modernization. It 
has often been theorized that the unique feudal, warlike 
I culture of ancient Japan accounted for the nation's swift 
conversion to industrial capitalism, which can easily beI 
I 
contrasted with China's slow and painful social philosophy. 
Nevertheless, many of the elements of modern Japanese 
society stem from a common tradition with China and with the 
I basic values of Confucianism. Similarities of written 
language, rare and "a tradi tion of agri cul turall y-based
I family and lineage organization within centralized state 
I systems" link the cultures of Japan, China and other Asian 
countries as well, noted Hofheinz and Calder (1987, p. 42). 
I More importantly for Neo-Confucianism, modern Japanese 
culture shares the ideal of the strong family, a concept
I which e~tends to workplace and corporate loyalties and a 
I 
I  
I  
I  great emphasis on education as a means of elevating the
 
entire family's status in the world: " Respect for ancestry 
I is built into the Confucian religion, which taught that piety 
towards one's elders is the most important of all virtues ••• 
I Japanese parents treat the education of their children as an 
I investment in the prestige and wealth of their family in the 
future." (1987, p. 45) The cooperation between generations 
I and loyalty to the family found in Japanese society are 
echoed in the group loyalty so often remarked upon in 
I 
I Japanese corporate life, where workers are often employed for 
life, perform group activities of song and exercise, and are 
encouraged to believe that management and its functionaries 
I are engaged in a collective effort with them to produce 
higher quality products and greater profits. 
I 
I The net effect of this ethic of social cooperation and 
group loyalty is to greatly increase the efficiency of the 
I 
Japanese bureaucracy, both government and corporate, and to 
minimize labor strikes while maximizing productivity. It is 
noteworthy that in Japan, government agencies, such as the 
I Ministry for International Trade and Industry, coordinate 
with industry; labor cooperates with management through the 
I  
I system of company unions, both relationships in stark
 
contrast to most Western economies. From the Western
 
perspective, Japanese labor unions appear "quiescent and 
I captive," observe Hofheinz and Calder (1987): "Japan, one of 
the world's most industrial nations, with a strong socialist
I movement, has remarkably fewer strikes than other developed 
I 
I  
I  
I countries... Though the incomes of workers elsewhere in 
Eastasia are mLlch lower than in Japan, their wages are still 
I enough higher than in most developing countries ••• Yet all 
these gains have taken place without a strong tradition of 
I 
I collective bargaining" (1987, p. 111). Japanese socio­
economic system sha~e a common fact with othe~ East Asian 
count~ies that the~e is a ~elative light conf~ontation, 
I adve~sa~y labo~-management ~elationship (1987, p. 110). 
Cultu~e is the logic diffe~ent ethics give o~de~ to the 
I wo~ld. Why some count~ies a~e economically bette~ than 
I othe~s? In this pape~, I explo~e the ~elationship between 
I 
Confucian cultu~e values and the st~iking economic g~owth 
that has taken place in Japan. The thesis of this pape~ is 
the cultu~al values of Confucianism and its allies 
I philosophical and ~eligions belief system se~ve as a basis 
foundation fo~ the new wo~k ethic of ent~ep~eneu~ in .the
I 
I 
high-g~owth economy of Japan. Specific attention will give 
to Confucian value on education and lea~ning which foste~ 
labo~ p~oductivity; familism and loyalty which smooth labo~ 
I management ~elationship. Howeve~, the pu~pose of this pape~ 
is not to p~oclaim that cultu~al facto~s a~e the majo~
I facto~s fo~ the economic g~owth of Japan. Instead, it is to 
I see how cultu~e cont~ibutes, suppo~ts othe~ economic policies 
to the economic development of Japan. Fo~ the pu~poses of 
I this study I conside~ Confucian cultu~e not simply in te~ms 
of the w~itings of Confucius of the fifth centu~y B.C., but 
I in te~ms of the Neo-Confucian cultu~e which has ~evolute 
I 
I  
I  
I since then to cooperate with economic development. 
I  
I  
I  
I  
I  
I  
I  
I  
I  
I  
I  
I  
I  
I  
I  
I  
I  
I  
I 2 CONFUCIAN LEARNING VALUE ENHANCE LABOR PRODUCTIVITY 
I Center to the Confucian thinking is the belief in the 
perfectibility and learning of human being. More than 2500 
I years ago, Confuciu espouse the idea of universal education
 
I  when he became a teacher of a great multitude of students.
 
During many dynasties of ancient China, scholars mostly 
I dominated the official bureaucracies, and there were 
series of vigorous examinations required for entry into this 
I ranking. As the popular saying goes; "you can discover a 
I gold house in BooKs," even in ancient China, Confucians believed that education was the making of a man's social 
I  status, career and economic wealth.
 
Confucius described a perfect gentleman (learner) should 
I have "a desire to see clearly when he looKs at something; a 
I desire to hear every detail when listening to something; a desire to present a tranquil countenance; a desire to 
I preserve an attitude of respect; a desire to be sincere in 
his words; a desire to be careful in his worK; a willingness 
I to enquire fLlrther into anything aboLJt which he has 
doubts; .••• " (Morishima, 19B2, p. 11). This diligent 
I 
I attitude in pursuing knowledge has been carrying over till 
today, considerably facilitating economic growth through the 
process of adopting advanced technologies in production. 
I Educational achievement obviously is vital to economic 
growth. Many observers consider this especially evident in 
I " 
I 
the case of Japan. Edwin O. Reischauer (1977) has written 
I  
I  
I nothing , in fact, is more central in Japanese society or 
more basic to Japan's success than its educational system." 
I 1977, p. 167). Concu ....ed Ez ..a F. Vogel;" If any factor 
explains Japanese success, it is the groLlp-directed quest for 
I knowledge" (Vogel, p. 27). John Whitney Hall (1975) believed 
I that "any attempt to explain Japan's exceptional success in 
national development must give a high degree of credit to 
I educational system which took on its modern guise Just a 
hundred years ago" (Ande..son, 1975, p ..eface). 
I 
I Education is a se .. ious business in Japan. Tokyo alone 
has ove.. a million unive..sity students. Japan is a society 
of employe..s and employees, whe..e education c ..edentials and 
I educated skills a ..e cent ..al to employment, p ..omotion, and 
gene..al social status. The familia .. sto..ies of the 
I fie ..ce competition and high-p..essu ..e among Japanese students 
to achieve ent ..ance examinations which stamp a young pe..son s 
I 
I choices of ca ..ee.. a ..e anothe.. example of the lasting impact 
of the Confucian belief that knowledge and lea ..ning a ..e 
powe... 
I Howeve.. , a ..eas of emphasizes of education have changed 
since the teachings of Confuciu. It is gene..ally believed 
I 
I that the ..e is a lack of well- ..ounded libe..al a .. ts and gene..al 
studies in Japan today. The application in mode..n Japan can 
be found in exceedingly high lite..acy ..ates and excellence of 
I technical t ..aining. As Confucius himself wa ..ned 
against the failu ..e to distinguish between ..ote lea ..ning and 
I t ..ue thought, in an obvious c .. iticism of the kind of 
I 
I  
I  
I  bu~eauc~atic schola~ship aimed simply at the passing of
 
examinations. Modern Japanese education suffe~s f~om the 
I same gap between ~ote learning and teaching-by-the-numbe~s 
and the essence of pe~sonal c~eativity and technological 
I 
I innovation. In gene~al, howeve~, this does not hampe~ the 
Japan in the g~owing stage of economic development, which use 
education p~ima~ily as a mean of t~aining a skilled and 
I ~eceptive wo~kfo~ce fo~ the businesses and facto~ies. "Japan 
now graduates more people from high school than any other 
I 
I country and has a higher literacy rate than the United States 
despite the more difficult written language ••• " (Hofheinz & 
Calde~, 1987, p. 46). The success of Japanese gove~nments in 
I t~aining a highly-educated, technically-skilled wo~kfo~ce fo~ 
immediate ent~y into thei~ bustling job ma~kets is notable. 
I 
I Levels of education a~e frequently incommensu~ate with lowe~­
~anking positions, and competition is gene~ally intense. This 
I 
technically-skilled wo~k fo~ce impose ~elative little 
difficulty in the p~ocess of t~ansfe~~ing technology f~om 
othe~ count~ies.
 
I Lea~ning is not const~aint only to students in schools
 
and{unive~sities in Japan. The~e is a gene~al assumption that 
I  
I eve~yone is a lea~ne~. Education is also a part of ca~ee~
 
life. The~e a~e fo~mal cou~ses o~ganized by the company o~
 
othe~ lea~ning cente~s p~epa~e employees fo~ p~omotions. 
I These sessions evoke ambitions of many employees. Anothe~ 
fo~m of fo~mal t~aining is less common in othe~ count~ies. 
I Its big t~ading g~oups o~ Kei~etsu fi~ms p~ovide automation 
I 
I  
I  
I  training courses for their affiliated companies and
 
subcontractors (Oore & Cabable, 1989). Furthermore, 
I correspondence courses are extensively available for anyone 
who want to acquire a specific skill. According to one 1986 
I 
I survey, 21% of firms revealed that they made use of them in 
their training programs, ranging from 43% of the largest to 
19% of the smallest (30-99 employee) firms (1989). They are 
I mostly inexpensive conventional text courses rather than 
expensive "electronic distance learning packages" (1989). 
I 
I Some of them are courses leading to certificates which 
fulfill any specific skills needed in the labor market. For 
instances, interpreters' courses, secretarial courses, 
I accountant, construction skills and so forth. Some of the 
certificate even endorse legal requirements such as safety 
I certificates various highly dangerous techniques and so on. 
In general, the majority of these course are designed to
I 
I 
enhance employees' work skills or to provide new directions 
for their careers (1989). Altogether, a Ministry of Labor 
guide lists some 1200 courses (1989). 
I Learning is a perception in Japan under Confucianism. 
Employers encourage employees to take these courses by 
I 
I offering exhortation, praise, mentions in the departmental 
newspaper, or the prospect that the initiative will be 
recognized at the annual performance review (1989). 
I Frequently employers offer to cover or to share the expense 
of the course with employees (1989). Since 1985, and the 
I revision of the Vocational Training Law which marked a 
I 
I  
I  
I noticeable shift of public expenditu~e away f~om emphasis on 
tr-aining II in the market", "fDr s tock ll towar-ds tr-aining wi thin 
I the ente~p~ise (1989), employe~s have been able to ~eclaim 
f~om the gove~nment t~aining fund pa~t of thei~ expenses in 
I suppo~ting co~~espondence cou~ses o~ cou~ses at outside 
I t~aining institutions - a qua~te~ fo~ la~ge~ fi~ms; a thi~d 
fo~ small and medium ente~p~ises (1989). The~efo~e, g~eat 
I majo~ity of Japanese ~eceived fo~mal educational t~aining 
which enable them to pa~ticipate in highly efficient 
I 
I o~ganizations to adapt at lea~ning bo~~owed and new 
technology. 
The Confucian cult of pe~fectionism --often pe~fection 
I th~ough endless ~epetition in lea~ning-- which has been 
cha~acte~istic of t~aditional a~ts. Fo~ instance, the vast 
I majo~ity of Japanese a~tists wo~k on a subject o~ a style 
th~oughout thei~ ca~ee~s (Japanese company, 1990, p. 170).
I 
I 
Yoshiha~u Kimu~a, a woodblock a~tist, has been d~awing only 
bi~ds fo~ twenty-five yea~s; anothe~, p~int-make~ Shigeki 
Ku~oda, has been devoting his life fo~ depicting only 
I bicycles and umb~ellas f~om eve~y conceivable pe~mutation fo~ 
ten yea~s (1990). By staying focused, these a~tists 
I 
I consistently imp~ove thei~ techniques. This p~ocess is 
called Kaizen, o~ continuous imp~ovement in Japan (1990). An 
Ame~ican executive who had wo~ked as vice p~esident fo~ 
I Toshiba fo~ ten yea~s in Japan witnessed that the Japanese 
a~e not inte~est only in the absolute ~esults, they a~e 
I equally inte~ested in the continuous p~ocess to st~ive fo~ 
I 
I  
I  
I perfection with the goal of achieving excellence (1990). For 
instance, Toshiba R&D management people in Japan said that 
I their mission was to be king of the IBM-compatible PC laptop, 
In 1987, there was an entrepreneur with an intriguing plan 
I 
I for a laptop computer with an Apple Macintosh base which was 
a solid scheme for solving the legal and technical issues in 
Toshiba (1990), however, the management did not want to 
I diverge Toshiba's efforts by going into another area. They 
believed the constant striving to do better and to learn from 
I your successes and failures on focus is an important step 
toward superior performance (1990). This diligent learning
I 
I 
perception applies in economic production has become a 
considerably factor that contributes to Japanese' superior 
performance in quality control system, provide a comparative 
I advantage of their products in international market, and 
eventually contribute partially to the economic success of
I 
I 
Japan. 
The study of Japanese economic growth during postwar 
years to 1971 by Edward Denison and William Chung (1976) for 
I Brooking Institution in 1976 showed that the economic growth 
rate of Japan was 8.8 % a year during the period, which 
I 
I exceeded the average of the other major developed countries 
(4.2%) by 4.6% points. Of this difference 1.0 % point is by a 
greater contribution from the application of new knowledge to 
I production (1976). Denison and Chung (1976) found that 
advances in knowledge and miscellaneous determinants is the 
I second largest contribution to economic growth besides 
I 
I  
I  
I capital formation. It contributed about 401. of the inputs per 
every output. It indicates that Japan secured from advances 
I in world's stock of knowledge which permitted to produce at 
I 
I 
IIlow cost. Education is thus a major- catch Upll in the 
contribution of economic development for its disadvantage in 
natural resources endowment. 
Sources of Growth of .4ctual National Income, •••• Whole 
I Economy, 1953-71 
Growth rates and contribution to growth 
I points 
I ITEM 
I National Income 
Total factor input 
I Labor Employment 
Hours 
Average hours
I Efficiency offset 
I 
Intergroup shift offset 
Age-sex composition 
Education 
Unallocated 
Capital 
I 
Output per unit of input
I Advances in knowledge 
I  
Whole 
1953-71 
8.77 
3.95 
1.85 
1.14 
0.21 
0.01 
0.18 
0.02 
0.14 
0.34 
0.02 
2.10 
4.82 
1.97 
rates in percentage 
economy 
1953-61 1961-71 
8.13 9.29 
3.63 4.35 
1.91 1. 78 
1.14 1.09 
0.38 0.11 
0.35 -0.27 
-0.06 0.38 
0.09 0.00 
0.07 0.19 
0.33 0.35 
-0.01 0.04 
1.62 2.57 
4.60 4.94 
1.42 2.43 
(1976, p. 38) Denison and Chung (1976) also found that 
I education background is a very important determinant of the 
quality of labor, and the increase in the education of the 
I labor force was a significant source of growth of national 
I 
I  
I  
I income in Japan. The study showed education contributes about 
1/5 of labor input on national income growth. Education 
I emphases one elemental economic truth: human resource 
I 
development is a slow, long-term, and costly process, but the 
I benefit is great, cumulative, and nearly always outweighs the 
cost. Intelligent and skilled human beings can make the most 
productive use of indigenous or imported natural resources. 
I Thus Morishima believes it was entirely owing to the 
intellectualism of Confucianism that Western science was 
I 
I transplanted smoothly in Japan despite of extreme culture 
differences (Morishima, 1982) 
Though there are still serious problems which education 
I in Japan, which tend to teach by rote and not by reason, 
employers can still pick from eager, well educated, and 
I highly motivated job applicants. Once on the job, Japanese 
workers are quick to learn, loyal and industrious. On the 
I 
I other hand, the rote learning and lack of philosophical 
inquiry in Japanese educational systems has its price. On 
the whole, technical innovation and its prerequisite, 
I research and development efforts, are underfunded and given 
secondary consideration. It is noteworthy that Japan spends 
I 
I only about 2.15% of its national income on R&D. as opposed 
to 2.48% in the U.S. and 2.64% for West Germany: "Support for 
science, though generally modest, is heavily concentrated in 
I areas yielding rapid dividends for industrial growth" 
(Hofheinz & Calder, 1987, p. 148). There have recently been 
I some efforts to rectify the R&D underfunding in Japan, 
I 
I  
I  
I where the fifth-generation computer project is receiving government and corporate funding on an unprecedented level. 
I But typically, that project has been conceived as a 
collective national effort rather than as a private, 
I 
I competitive enterprise. There is a general worry in Japanese 
society now that rote learning rather than creative thinking 
might hinder economic growth in Japan in high-tech ages of 
I 21st century. 
Education is important in economic growth. As the 
I Chairman of International Business Machine, John Akers said: 
"Education isn't just a social concern, it's a major economic
I 
I 
issue. If our students can't compete today, how will our 
companies compete tomorrow? " (Akers, 1991, p. 161). With 
the successful example in Japan, Americans start to pay 
I attention to the quality education issue which is vital to 
the training of labor, an essential factor in economic 
I 
I production. The Japanese seems to capture this view a long 
time ago from Confucianism. And in Japan, with her poor 
natural endowment, human resources become vital in 
I production. 
Confucian concept of education. and learning serve as a 
I 
I bridge between Western technology and production output. 
Without a keen attitude toward learning, without her 
diligent, hard-learning citizens, without a competent and 
I increasing skilled labor force, a good deal of the 
technological knowledge might well have been wasted or not 
I undertaken in the first place. On the other hand, without 
I 
I  
I  
I advanced technological knowledge, a great sense of learning 
would not promote economic production with such speed, such 
I as in China itself. Thus, I believe that Confucian belief in 
the importance of learning contributes to the growth of 
I economy in this light. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I  
I  
I  3) CONFUCIAN FAMILISM SMOOTHS LABOR RELATIONSHIP
 
I Confucian values generally center around family or clan 
rules, or the ethical and philosophical beliefs determining 
I 
I behavior within the basic social unit of traditional Chinese 
life: the extended family. At the heart of these values lies 
the central concept for one's parents, grandparents and 
I elders in general: "filiCll piety is CI mCltter of intLiitive 
knowledge Clnd Clbility, Clnd in fClct exists in mCln's nCltLire 
I 
I itself. FClilLire to render filiCll piety to pClrents is Llsed to 
be CI crime ClgClinst heClven" (Liu, 1959, p. B4). More 
I 
generally, filial piety represents the generation obligations 
linking the young to their elders, and through them to the 
cultural values and traditions of their ancestors. 
I In addition, Confucian filial piety includes a set of 
social norms for behavior that, although traditionally 
I 
I required only of the son as "ideCll gentlemCln," ultimately 
extend to all members of society. Even acknowledging the 
importance of the family life, however, Confucian filial 
I piety would be unimportant for society as a whole were it not 
for the fact that" the clCln rLiles regClrd it CIS the bClsic 
I 
I element in Clll sLibordinClte-sLiperior relCltionships, extending 
to all elders, and to higher authority and "sLiperiors in 
generCll" (1959, p. 85). In short, Confucian values came to 
I represent a set of ethical values and social norms which are 
more group-oriented than most Western socio-economic 
I philosophies, which tend to place more emphasis on individual 
I 
I  
I  
I  autonomy and class mobility.
 
With ~espect to the ~ole of gove~nments, co~po~ations 
I and la~ge~ nationalist loyalties, Confucianism also offe~s 
some unique advantages to the new indust~ial state of Japan. 
I 
I The hie~a~chical autho~ity of the "scholar-bureaucracy" of 
ancient China me~ged with the local autho~ity of clans and 
villages in dual social st~uctu~e: " ••• a national 
I bureaucratic superstructure emphasizing centralization, 
standardization, formalism .•• based on a morally oriented 
I 
I social order and the informal primary group" (Yang, 1959, p. 
135). C. K. Yang speaks of this "conglomeration" of 
I 
communities as being held togethe~ by 'a common acceptance of 
the Confucian ideology" (1959, p. 136). Today, this fo~mula 
might be changed to emphasize a st~ongly-o~ganized national 
I economy, as the new indust~ial state has supe~sede 
t~aditional loyalties to impe~ial o~ nationalist ideals. The
I 
I 
Neo-Confucian economic o~de~ is o~ganized within a "highly 
status conscious society" (1959, p. 140) in which p~ospe~ity 
is a ca~dinal vi~tue. 
I Du~ing the Tokugawa pe~iod (1600-1868), the most 
impo~tance social units we~e the small size fa~ming units, 
I 
I family o~ganization of p~oduction, and the unspa~i~g use of 
hand labo~. These family welfa~e continued to be of 
t~anscendent value, its autho~ity immense. Solida~ity and 
I obedience we~e taught to the young as conditions of su~vival, 
and these t~aditional values ca~~ied ove~ to behavio~ outside 
I the family. 
I 
I  
I  
I Between 1868 and 1900, the early stage of Japanese 
industrialization, Japan was still basically an agricultural 
I country with only one major manufacturing industry, textiles, 
which were exported to finance the purchase of foreign 
I 
I technology. Ninety per cent of the employees in textile 
industries were female at that time (Tsunoyama, 1965). They 
were brought from country areas to work in family workshops. 
I Frequently, agreements were made between the factory's 
representatives and the family heads and village elders 
I during recruitment. The units of organization were small, the 
I  relationship between authority of the managers, elder, male,
 
and urban and workers, young, female, and rural was 
I traditional. Most employers offered the young women in the 
I 
textile industries benefits such as housing, food, and 
I classes in Japanese accomplishments (Okimoto & Rohlen, 1988). 
In the growing importance of the metal and steel 
industries in 1900, employees were mostly men. These heavy 
I  industries constantly needed skilled labor for production.
 
However, there was a shortage of skilled labor during the 
I initial stage of modernization. Employers needed to 
immobilize the skilled labor and changed their personnel 
I 
I policies to offer their employees the prospects of a career, 
with better jobs and higher pay after an appropriate lengths 
of service, and welfare schemes and profits-related bonuses 
I as further inducements to stay. All these are forerunners of 
these well-known, unique features of Japanese management:
I lifetime employment and seniority pay. 
I 
I  
I  
I The relationship between managers and employees and 
between capitalist and labor were essentially harmonious. The 
I spirit in industries were mutual understanding, peace, and 
solicitude, so much so that it was possible to assimilate the 
I factory to the family. The idea of familism, the epitome of 
I Japanese uniqueness, was perfectly adapted to interpret the idea of harmony and cooperation in relation among employees 
I and between employees and their firms in the labor market 
(1988). Japanese labor management relationships are a result 
I 
I 'of heritage, this heritage was derived from Confucian 
familism. 
I 
In Western countries, United States, for instance, 
unions are established on the basis of trades and related 
jobs. When negotiating contracts, a company may have to 
I negotiate with as many as a dozen different unions and 
establish distinct contracts with each before it is able to
I 
I 
operate its business. In contrast, Japanese unions are in 
effect company-based unions, make up of the working force of 
the company under department chiefs. 
I Dues are paid directly to the enterprise union, and no 
national or outside industrial unions representatives sit in
I on collective bargaining sessions. Japanese unions are 
I  separated from the owners' interest, but are often
 sympatt~tic to the needs and the requirements of management. 
I However, they are independent and free to bargain over the 
issues of wages and work conditions in a manner common to 
I unions allover the world (Hiroshi, 1976). Relations within 
I 
I  
I  
I the Japanese company families a~e not always ha~monious, but 
eve~y effo~t is made to keep all disag~eement within the 
I family. Thus, most st~ikes a~e within the cont~ol of 
management. 
I 
I The majo~ diffe~ence f~om the Weste~n nations lies in 
the fact that the company-based union membe~s identify 
closely with economic inte~est of the company which employs 
I the membe~s. With the national policy of annual bonuses based 
upon the p~ofits of the company, the~e is little o~ no 
I inte~est in slowing down wo~k, or technological slowdown. 
I  The company-based featu~e of union ~einfo~ces employees'
 loyalty to the company. Wo~ke~s find little in common with 
I the man doing the same job at anothe~ company--that man does 
not have the same inte~est as he does in his company's 
I su~vival. 
Familism and loyalty within the company a~e fu~ther
I 
I 
cultivated by the lifetime employment system. Unde~lying 
this system was a belief on the pa~t of the company that high 
p~oductive employees should be given legitimated lifetime 
I membe~ship in the family. This ca~ee~ p~omise is much g~eate~ 
than any p~actice in the Weste~n world, though it only
I p~ovide fo~ about 25% of the wo~k fo~ce. Management p~ovides 
I  in-se~vice t~aining, indoct~ination, and active p~omotion fo~
 
the employees. The company leade~ship was expected to, and 
I did p~ovide gifts fo~ ma~~iages, bi~th, etc. They also act 
as pe~sonal counselo~s fo~ those who felt the need of 
I assistance. 
I 
I  
I  
I In ~etu~n· fo~ this, the employe~ had a pe~manent wo~k 
fo~ce that st~ongly identified itself with the inte~ests of 
I the company, had a ~elatively low level of labo~ un~est, was 
loyal and dedicated to the needs of the company, and would be 
I not only willing but often eage~ to wo~k afte~ wo~king hou~s, 
I without pay, in quality cont~ol ci~cles and othe~ p~og~ams to imp~ove the efficiency and quality of p~oduction fo~ the 
I benefit of the company.
 
Loyalty is fu~the~ induced by the unique Japanese
 
I  
I p~actice of wage system, the senio~ity wage system. Japanese
 
employees' wages a~e tied to the length of se~vice, pay would
 
g~ow with the yea~s of se~vice. This p~actice is, on one 
I  hand, to immobilize wo~k fo~ce; it is also, on the othe~,
 
evidence showing the society's ~espect towa~d elde~ly unde~
 
I Confucian influence.
 
The~e is obviously a high level of consistency between

I the Japanese cultu~e and the way co~po~ations ope~ate. 
I Japanese fi~ms a~e able to function smoothly because they a~e 
like extended families. Japanese fi~ms do not need to spend a 
I lot of time and effo~t solving labo~-management conflicts. 
Management deals with each wo~ke~ as a family membe~ ~athe~ 
I 
I than as a cont~acted employees. Management's conce~n fo~ each 
wo~ke~'s well-being goes beyond the job and the pay check. 
The conce~n inc~eases commitment and loyalty to and 
I identification with the fi~m. Inte~esting to note that 
Japanese bosses do not usually have thei~ own p~ivate 
I offices. They a~e usually seated in the cente~s of a la~ge 
I 
I  
I  
I  office with othe~ subo~dinates. This signifies the
 
closeness between the employe~ and the employees. It also 
I foste~ info~mation flow in the wo~k place that the employe~ 
is constantly being info~med about the company and his 
I 
I employees. He is like a family head who keeps t~ack of the 
business of the family units. 
The coope~ation between management and labo~ has been a 
I positive facto~ in the ~apid and continuous technological 
upg~ading of Japanese indust~y. In the United States, 
I 
I technological advance that a~e often ~esisted by unions on 
g~ounds that jobs will be sac~ificed. In Japan, jobs cannot 
be sac~ificed, and any technological advance that inc~eases 
I p~oductivity 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
benefits eve~ybody. 
I  
I  
I 4) CONCLUSION: CONFUCIANISM IN THE NATIONS OF EAST ASIA AND THE FUTURE OF NEO-CONFUCIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
I 
I 
Just as the Confucian cultu~e of discipline, g~oup 
I loyalty and benevolent pate~nalism has mig~ated outwa~d f~om 
its point of o~igin in mainland China, so has the patte~n of 
I 
economic development now taking place on the pe~iphe~y of the 
mainland and ac~oss East Asia. 
We have seen that Confucianism in its mode~n 
I manifestations is a social ethic based on g~oup solida~ity, 
In cont~ast to the much-celeb~ated P~otestant wo~k ethic at
I 
I 
the ~oot of weste~n economic and indust~ial development, the 
Asia wo~k ethic seems to delibe~ately down-play individualism 
and special inte~ests, in favo~ of stability and social 
I ha~mony. As Lucian Pye (1985) obse~ve5, such a wo~k ethic 
seems not to be incompatible with capitalism and individual 
I 
I p~ospe~i ty: "The success of the Japanese , and now of the 
Koreans, Taiwanese and Singaporeans, in building modern 
institutions through strong groLlp loyalties suggests that 
I individualism does not have to be either a prerequisite or a 
consequence of economi c devel opmen t" (1985, p. 178). Yet Neo­
I  
I Confucian values a~e clea~ly inte~p~eted and developed
 
diffe~ently within the diffe~ent social and political
 
cultu~es of Japan and othe~ East Asia, which ~ange f~om a~ch­

I capitalist Hong Kong to a ve~y diffe~ent ethic cultu~es in
 
South Ko~ea and Singapo~e.
 
I The system of "Confucian Benevolence" in East Asian
 
I 
I  
I  
I labo~ ~elations implies that management pate~nalism will give 
wo~ke~s good wages, job secu~ity and ample side benefits 
I without ~equi~ing coe~cion o~ conf~ontation to do so. The 
actual implementation of such a system must va~y f~om count~y 
I to count~y, but the essential patte~n of non-conf~ontation, 
I institutional pate~nalism is to be found ac~oss East Asia. As Hofheinz and Calde~ point out, "in Japan, Confucian 
I benevolence is the monopoly of the private firm ••• Wrapped in 
a cocoon of corporate paternalism, within a web of hl,man ties 
I centering on the workplace, the Japanese worker cooperates 
closely with management. ln China and North Korea, labor
I paternalism 'is the province of the state, which owns the 
I enterprise in which workers spend their lives. The myth that 
the workers own their government informs the reality that 
I factories provide permanent employment" (Hofheinz and Calde~, 
1987, p. 113). Although wages and living conditions diffe~
I d~amatically between the capitalist and communist count~ies 
I of East Asia, the~e is an unde~lying unifo~mity in the 
philosophical app~oach to ~elations between wo~ke~s and 
I management. 
The bu~eauc~atic emphasis on gove~nment cont~ol of 
I 
I finance, indust~ial policy and education a~e othe~ aspects 
which link the dispa~ate systems of China, Japan, Taiwan and 
Ko~ea in a "neo-Confucian" ethic; only wide-open Hong Kong, 
I and to a lesse~ extent Singapo~e, stands outside this 
t~adition among the new giants of indust~ial East Asia. The 
I banking systems of Japan, Taiwan and Ko~ea, says Robe~t Wade 
I 
I  
I  
I (1985), a~e used "in a subtle way to help effect national 
I 
industrial policy," th~ough st~ict management of c~edit and 
the cost of capital, balance of payments flows, and fo~eign 
exchange t~ansactions: "Taiwan, Japan and Korea have 
I financial systems far from the liberal type: with tight 
controls over interest rates, limited choice of financial 
I 
I instruments, limited fund ••• savers in Taiwan, Japan and 
Korea have few options other than to put their savings into a 
bank ••• and banks have limited autonomy and are few in 
I number••• " (1985, p. 123). Wade (1985) also ~ema~ks upon the 
"guided sectional mobility" made possible by a national 
I 
I indust~ial policy, the lack of fo~eign bo~~owing made 
possible by the wo~ld's highest p~opo~tions of investment and 
savings to income, and the ~eduction of financial instability 
I made possible by the ~eliance upon gove~nment-dominated banks 
fo~ vi~tually all financing. All cont~ibute to the Confucian 
I 
I patte~n of benign, gove~nment-guided capitalism in which the 
app~oach to ~elations between capital, p~ivate p~ope~ty and 
the state a~e fundamentally diffe~ent f~om that of the mo~e 
I unst~uctu~ed Weste~n indust~ial nations. 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China 
I 
I might also be taken as vastly diffe~ent East Asian economic 
systems, the fi~st two a~ch-capitalist and the latte~ 
Ma~xist-Leninist, but simila~ities in cultu~al outlook in 
I these Chinese nations all ~eveal the imp~int of NeD-Confucian 
economic ideology society in a se~ies of Five Yea~ plans, so 
I have the fie~cely anti-communist Taiwanese allowed the 
I 
I  
I  
I  gove~nment to di~ectly ~est~uctu~e thei~ national economy:
 
"What has counted for Taiwan is a series of four years 
I economic plans begun in 1953. They have taken the offshore 
province from abject poverty ••• to the brink of a consumer 
I  
I boom. They did so by re-modeling the structure of the  
economy: in 1952 agri cul tLlre' s share of gross domestic  
product was 32/. and indLlstry's was 22/., today, agricul ture 
I accounts for less than 6/. of GDP and industrial output for 
around half" (T~ansition on, 1988, p. 5). Although the 
I 
I Confucian ethic was essentially ag~a~ian in ancient times, 
its mode~n counte~part is agg~essively indust~ializing, with 
count~ies like Taiwan and Ko~ea pu~suing indust~ialization in 
I a fo~ced p~og~am simila~ to that imposed on China by Mao. 
Another common aspect of Neo-Confucian ideology to be 
I 
I found in East Asian count~ies f~om Communist China to 
Capitalist Taiwan is the emphasis on political stability at 
I 
all costs. but it has ~e-eme~ged as a dominant theme of the 
new ~egime, which seems to be seeking a new set of ethical 
standa~ds; t~aditional ~eligion---and t~aditional 
I Confucianism in pa~ticula~-- is suddenly being ~ehabilitated 
in the People's Republic, and in 1988, a celeb~ation of 
I 
I Confuciu's bi~thday was taken place in the People's Hall in 
Beijing, to be followed by a majo~ confe~ence on 
Confucianism. Once seen as a fo~ce p~eventing mode~nization 
I th~ough its autho~ita~ian and hie~a~chical value system, 
Confucianism is now seen by Chinese Communist leade~s as a
I possible means of instilling a wo~k ethic and economic 
I 
I  
I  
I  morality during the gradual introduction of free markets.
 
While the underlying principles of Neo-Confucian culture
 
I are found to some degree in all of the East Asian countries
 
under discussion, their impact on policies for economic
 
I development has obviously been very different in each
 
I  country. Perhaps the greatest differences lie between
 
countries like Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore, which have 
I achieved to a remarkable degree the economic and social 
stability so highly value in Confucianism, and countries like 
I 
I South Korea and the People's Republic of China, where the 
rapid pace of development has led to considerable social and 
political unrest in the last few years. South Korea, for 
I example, has pushed industrialization and support growth at 
the expense of housing, health care and democratic values in 
I 
I government. T. W. Kang (1989) argues that without more 
attention to these considerations, which lie at the heart of 
I 
the Confucian ethic of authoritarian paternalism, South Korea 
will become mired in the sort of ongoing disturbances that 
have plagued that country in the 1900s (1989). 
I Taiwan's prospects for continued economic growth and 
export expansion are perhaps as good as any other of the East 
I 
I Asian nations, in spite of that country's current status as a 
virtual outcast in the world political community. Like Japan, 
Taiwan must now work to avoid alienating its trading partners 
I in the West, with whom it enjoys a huge, almost embarrassing 
trade surplus:" Taiwan sells too much and buys too little 
I for good relations with its trading partners. in 1981 the 
I 
I  
I  
I  trade surplus was $1.8 billion; by 1984 it was $9.2 billion.  
Last year (1987)) it was around $19 billion ••• At the end 
I of 1as t year these reserves were a stupendous $75 bi 11 ion • .• " 
(T~ansition on, 1988, p. 6). With savings ~ates a~ound 40% 
I 
I and investment ~ates only about 18%, Taiwan now has 
sufficient fo~eign exchange ~ese~ves to pay its enti~e impo~t 
bill fo~ the next two-and -a-half yea~s. Some have att~ibuted 
I this success to the state's ~igo~ous discipline of the 
economy (Gold, 1985). But at least pa~t of the c~edit must go 
I  
I to the Neo-Confucian value system which emphasizes saving,
 
th~ift and economic self-discipline at the p~ivate level.
 
I 
Of such g~eate~ inte~est and u~gency is the question of 
the economic and social integ~ation of Hong Kong with the 
People's Republic, scheduled fo~ 1997. Even at the cu~~ent 
I pace of economic and political liberation in the mainland, 
the t~emendous diffe~ences between the f~eewheeling fo~me~
I B~itish colony and the socialist mothe~ count~y a~e so g~eat 
I  that the Deng ~egimes f~eely admits it must allow a "two- 
system" state in o~de~ to achieve ~e-unification. The 1983 
I comments of Communist Pa~ty Gene~al Sec~eta~y Hu Yaobang to 
the Japanese P~ess ~eveal that the Chinese a~e counting on a
I ce~tain simila~ity of Confucian p~agmatism to smooth ove~ the 
I  difficulties of this last, g~eat t~ansition fo~ Hong Kong.
 
While count~ies like the Philippines and Aust~alia have 
I pu~sued explicitly Weste~n models of development, and 
count~ies like Thailand and Indonesia mo~e esote~ic Buddhist 
I and Islamic cultu~al models, the nations of East Asia have 
I 
I  
I  
I  adapted the cultural models, the cultural values of Neo­

Confucianism to build a hugely successful engine for economic
 
I development. It now remains to be seen whether the largest
 
and most important of the Neo-Confucian cultures, The
 
I  
I People's Republic of China, will follow this path.
 
If it is true that China "n:mains atypical of the region  
today," it is not necessarily true that a Communist nation
 
I cannot adapt itself to pragmatic Neo-Confucian development
 
policies while retaining the shell of a socialist system. At
 
I present, "China .•• is not a trading nation. Its vast 
I  agricultural population and inaccessible interior make  
foreign contacts difficult. •• " (Hofheinz & Calder, 1987, p. 
I 63), and an export-based economy a remote prospect. But if 
the Deng regime succeeds in continuously pushing for economic 
I 
I liberalization, China may well rank among the most powerful 
of the East Asian Neo-Confucian economies by the beginning of 
I 
the next century. 
In summary, due to the limit scope of this study, it is 
difficult to link neo-Confucian culture as a direct cause of 
I the economic growth of Japan, and the area of cultural 
explanation of any economy is still controversial in the 
I 
I Economic field. However, without doubt, neo-Confucian culture 
has provided a favorable condition, if not a cause, for the 
economic growth of Japan. Its ideology on learning and 
I filial piety serve as catalysts in the "take-off" stage of 
modernization and economic development in its land, in which
I a technical-skilled labor force and relatively harmonious 
I 
I  
I  
I labo~-management ~elationship painlessly t~ansfe~ Japan f~om 
an mountainous count~y to a wo~ld economic powe~ in less than 
I two centuries. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I  
I  
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